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SMALL STATE WITH A BIG TRADITION: NORWAY 
CONTINUES WHALING AT THE EXPENSE OF 
INTEGRATION AND NORDIC COOPERATION 
Sonja Marta Halverson• 
INTRODUCTION 
Harvesting the minke whale has become a symbol of sovereignty 
and cultural tradition to Norwegians.1 Throughout whaling history, 
Norwegians have hunted whales to the point of near-extinction, have 
made technological discoveries that made whaling more humane, and 
have promoted sustainable development to help whales recover from the 
over-exploitation of centuries past. 2 
Just as the history of whaling is intertwined with Norwegian 
history, Norwegian history is deeply connected with the histories of 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and especially Sweden. 3 Because of their 
common history, Norwegian whaling could put Sweden in a potentially 
precarious position. As Norway continues to whale despite 
international opposition, Sweden must reconcile its anti-whaling policy 
with its close relationship to Norway. For example, if Sweden publicly 
supports the Norwegian whaling policy, Sweden could face criticism 
from the United States and lose its reputation as an environmental 
model. 
Additionally, Norwegian whaling may disrupt the balance and 
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1. See generally Brian Trevor Hodges, The Cracking Fa9ade of the International 
Whaling Commission as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian Small-Type 
Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 295 (2000); 
Martha Howton, International Regulation of Commercial Whaling: The Consequences of 
Norway's Decision to Hunt the Minke Whale, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 175 
(1994). 
2. See generally Ray Gambell, The International Whaling Commission and the 
Contemporary Whaling Debate, in CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE 
MAMMALS 179 (John R. Twiss, Jr. & Randall R. Reeves eds., 1999). 
3. Hilary Barnes, Nordic Togetherness: Let Us Count the Ways, 86 SCANDINAVIAN 
REv. 68 (1998), available at 1998 WL 22014855; see Tor Dagre, The History of Norway, 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/history/032005-990454/index-dokOOO-b-n-a.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004) (describing how Denmark relinquished Norway to Sweden after 
the Napoleonic Wars, and how Norway then united with Sweden until Sweden granted 
independence in 1905). 
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cooperation in the Nordic region. The international community, 
including the United States, has condemned Norway's whaling policy.4 
This opposition may lead to threats and sanctions against Norway, 
which could affect the Nordic region as a whole.5 If Norway continues 
to apply sustainable development to its whaling policy and continues to 
promote environmental protection, the subsequent legitimization of its 
whaling practice might ease the tension in the Nordic region. 
This Note has been separated into five parts. Part I summarizes the 
history of whaling, details Norwegian contributions to the whaling 
industry, and outlines the formation and transformation of the 
International Whaling Commission. Part II discusses the legality of 
Norwegian whaling, enforcement failures within the International 
Whaling Commission, and exceptions to international law that legalize 
Norwegian whaling. Part III illustrates the negative effect of 
Norwegian whaling on Norway's relationship with the European Union 
and the potential effect that whaling could have on other Nordic 
countries. Part IV examines the future of Norwegian whaling and 
contemplates the possibility of Norway discontinuing its whaling 
policy. Finally, Part V concludes with a prediction of the effect of 
Norway's whaling on its foreign policy, focusing particularly on 
Norway's relationship with Sweden. 
I. THE HISTORY OF WHALING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGULATORY 
REGIME 
Boasting a whaling tradition that dates back to 800 A.D., Norway 
has greatly influenced the whaling industry.6 Norway played a 
significant role in the advent of modem whaling when a Norwegian 
named Svend Foyn invented the explosive grenade harpoon in 1864.7 
Prior to this invention, whalers were relegated to hunting slow-moving 
whales close to the shore. 8 After the invention, whalers were able to 
launch explosive grenade harpoons from cannons on ship decks, 
providing opportunities to catch whales that lived further out in the 
4. /FAW: Commercial Whaling at a Crossroads on Eve of /WC Meeting, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, June 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55658870. 
5. Id.; see Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A 
Prospective for the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 308 (1996). 
6. Nytt fra Norge for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Minke Whaling, 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/environment/032001-990108/index-dokOOO-b-n-
a.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. 
7. Gambell, supra note 2, at 180. 
8. See id. 
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North Atlantic.9 The invention of factory ships, which facilitated the 
immediate processing of whales once they were caught, allowed 
whalers to venture farther into the ocean in search of flourishing species 
of whales. 10 Svend Foyn's invention of the explosive grenade harpoon 
and the advent of factory ships greatly contributed to the depletion of 
whale stocks in the North Atlantic. 11 
The Formation of the International Whaling Commission 
The over-exploitation of whale species in the North Atlantic 
ultimately resulted in self-regulation of the whaling industry. During 
the height of commercial whaling, whales were considered common 
resources, and nations were disinclined to promote conservation 
because whaling was a profitable venture. 12 Whalers recognized the 
over-exploitation of many species of whales; however, instead of 
halting commercial whaling, the whalers simply sought out new hunting 
grounds. 13 Norway realized that whale stocks were low and 
implemented a moratorium on whaling in Norwegian waters in 1903.14 
While the moratorium protected the whales in waters close to Norway, 
the ban eventually inspired Norwegian whalers to search for new 
hunting grounds. 15 In an effort to protect all species of whales, Norway 
encouraged whaling nations to decrease whaling and implement a 
licensing system. 16 This proposal eventually led to an attempt by the 
whaling industry to regulate itself. 17 Norway and Great Britain, 
accountable for ninety-five percent of the world's catch in the 1930s, 
entered into an agreement that regulated their respective whaling 
industries.18 The Norwegian government subsequently proposed a 
series of conferences to discuss the regulation of the whaling industry. 19 
These conferences inspired the United States, an active participant in 
the whaling industry, to initiate the International Convention for the 
9. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 180.; see also Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their 
Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Norwegian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway's Decision 
to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 155, 160 (1994). 
10. Gambell, supra note 2, at 180. 
11. Id. 
12. PETER J. STOETT, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 6-8 (Univ. of British 
Columbia 1997). 
13. Stein, supra note 9, at 160. 
14. Id. 
15. Id.; see also Schiffman, supra note 5, at 308. 
16. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 310. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 310-11; see also Gambell, supra note 2, at 181. 
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Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) in 1946.20 
Pro-whaling nations convened at the ICRW to form limits and 
regulations that would prevent continued exploitation of whale species. 
The fifteen participants included the United States, Norway, Japan, and 
Russia.21 These nations worked together to establish the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC), which "im~lement[ ed] both the economic 
and environmental goals of the ICRW." 2 The preamble of the ICRW 
stated that the purpose of the convention was to conserve whale stocks 
in order for the whaling industry to continue operation.23 The ICRW 
produced two documents: the IWC Schedule and the IWC Convention. 
The Schedule governed the conduct of whalers and set limits on the 
amount of whales that could be harvested. 24 The catch limits created by 
the Schedule were neither mandatory nor binding under the Convention 
text. 25 Instead, the Convention expected the member nations to codify 
the text into their own legal systems and enforce the limitations 
individually.26 While the IWC purported to conserve whale stocks, the 
Convention did little to prevent whaling nations from over-exploiting 
whale populations. 27 
The Transformation of the International Whaling Commission 
The failure of the ICRW to protect whale stocks and regulate the 
whaling industry troubled non-member nations around the world as 
several species of whales came dangerously close to extinction. 28 In an 
effort to prevent the extinction of these whale srsecies, non-member 
states began to apply for membership in the ICRW. 9 As the ICRW text 
specifies, nations that afoee to adhere to the text of the ICRW will be 
accepted into the IWC. 0 Subsequently, the number of IWC member 
20. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 181 ; see also Schiffman, supra note 5, at 311. 
21. Gambell, supra note 2, at 182-83. The original IWC member nations included: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. 
22. Stein, supra note 9, at 165. 
23. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/Convention.htm (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter ICRW]. 
24. See Gambell, supra note 2, at 181. 
25. See id. at 182. 
26. See ICRW, supra note 23, art. IX; see also Gambell, supra note 2, at 183. 
27. Gambell, supra note 2, at 183. 
28. See id. at 184. 
29. Id. 
30. ICRW, supra note 23, art. X (4). 
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nations grew from fifteen in 1946 to forty in 1998.31 While the original, 
pro-whaling members of the IWC originally sought to conserve and 
maintain whale stocks, new members acted under the influence of the 
growing environmental movements within their respective countries. 32 
Most of the new members had "little or no direct" connection to 
whaling, but were "concerned about the effects" of over-exploiting 
whales.33 As an increasing number of anti-whaling nations joined the 
IWC, the purpose of the IWC shifted from conservation and sustainable 
use of whales to complete preservation of every species of whale. 34 
With the majority of the member nations now favoring an anti-
whaling policy, the IWC began to implement reductions in catch 
limits. 35 Even nations that had once engaged in commercial whaling 
supported these drastic reductions.36 To pass any new amendments to 
the ICRW, including catch reductions, the ICRW text specifies that 
there must be a three-fourths majority in favor of the proposed 
amendment. 37 If not for the huge influx of anti-whaling nations into the 
IWC, these reductions in catch limits would not have achieved the 
requisite majority.38 In 1982, a sufficient number of anti-whaling 
nations had joined the IWC to tip a three-fourths majority in favor of 
completely preserving whales. 39 The IWC subsequently implemented 
more than just a reduction in catch limits; the IWC executed a complete 
moratorium on commercial whaling.40 
The IWC's moratorium effectively distorted the purpose and spirit 
of the ICRW.41 The original purpose of the ICRW was clear: to 
conserve whale stocks for future generations of whalers.42 Instead of 
continuing to reduce whale quotas in order to conserve whale stocks, 
the new anti-whaling majority embraced the idea that the practice of 
whaling should be terminated completely.43 In fact, the IWC was 
31. Gambell, supra note 2, at 182-83. 
32. Hodges, supra note 1, at 301-02. 
33. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184. 
34. See Hodges, supra note 1, at 304. 
35. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184. 
36. Id. 
37. ICRW, supra note 23, art. III (2). 
38. Gambell, supra note 2, at 184. 
39. Howton, supra note 1, at 177-78. 
40. Id. 
41. Jon L. Jacobson, Whales, the /WC, and the Rule of Law, in TOWARD A 
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 81-82 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 82. 
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criticized for misinterpreting its own treaty and for manipulating and 
politicizing an otherwise valid purpose of whale conservation.44 The 
anti-whaling majority adopted this moratorium with little authority 
under the ICRW, and then criticized the pro-whaling minority that 
opposed the moratorium. 45 
The moratorium on whalinf marked one of the most significant 
events in the history of whaling.4 The moratorium reduced catch limits 
to zero, but the actual reduction extended over a three-year period to 
give whaling nations time to phase out their commercial whaling 
industries.47 Norway and six other countries immediately lodged a 
formal objection.48 In vigorous opposition to the moratorium, both 
Japan and Norway pledged to continue whaling.49 The Commission 
could do nothing to stop the two countries from continuing their 
whaling practices since it had no power to enforce the ban on whaling. 50 
The moratorium on commercial whaling marked the end of an era: 
nations no longer viewed oceans as common property to be exploited, 
and the act of whale hunting emerged as an immoral and unethical 
practice. 
II. NORWAY'S DECISION TO RESUME WHALING 
Although Norway lodged a formal objection to the moratorium, the 
country voluntarily halted whaling activities pending the research 
results of the IWC's Scientific Committee.51 The Committee estimated 
that roughly 112,000 minke whales inhabited the Northeast Atlantic and 
72,000 minke whales inhabited the central Atlantic.52 Despite available 
scientific evidence showing minke whales could withstand limited 
whaling, the Scientific Committee effectively extended the moratorium 
44. See Jacobson, supra note 41, at 98. 
45. See id. at 82. 
46. Stein, supra note 9, at 167. 
47. Id. at 168; Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International Whaling 
Commission: Suggestions to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 639, 
650-651 (2002); International Whaling Commission, Commercial Whaling Catch Limits, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/Catches.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter International 
Whaling Commission]. 
48. International Whaling Commission, supra note 47. 
49. Stein, supra note 9, at 168. Japan subsequently withdrew its formal objection to the 
moratorium in 1985. Id. Believing that the formal objection would lead to conflict with the 
Soviet Union, Japan ceased all commercial whaling in 1988. Id. 
50. International Whaling Commission, supra note 47. 
51. Gambell, supra note 2, at 190. 
52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
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by refusing to reevaluate it based on the available scientific evidence. 53 
As a result of the extended ban on whaling, Iceland withdrew from the 
IWC in 1992.54 Norway remained a member of the IWC; however, the 
Scientific Committee's decision ultimately fueled .the Norwegian 
government's decision to resume whaling.55 In 1992, Norway argued 
that if the number of minke whale stocks reported by the IWC's 
Scientific Committee was accurate, then the minke whale species could 
withstand limited whaling. 56 After specifying whaling procedures and 
implementing a strict permit-based system, Norwegian coastal whalers 
resumed their whaling tradition in 1993. 57 
Norway's decision to resume whaling enraged the international 
community. 58 Within the IWC, the anti-whaling nations condemned 
Norway's decision to defy the new spirit of the ICRW.59 Shortly after 
Norway made the announcement, fifteen members of the IWC signed a 
statement encouraging Norway to reconsider its decision to resume 
whaling. 6° Furthermore, the international community "threatened ... 
economic boycotts, blockage of its [Norway's] bid to join the European 
Community, and boycotts of the 1994 winter Olympics to be held in 
Lillehammer."61 Nevertheless, Norway upheld its decision to resume 
whaling and maintained that its whaling policy complied with 
international law.62 
Norwegian Whaling: A Violation of International Law? 
There are three legitimate foundations upon which Norway may 
argue that its decision to resume whaling complies with international 
law. First, the IWC has no enforcement mechanism to legally bind 
53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
54. Gambell, supra note 2, at 190. 
55. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
56. Judith Berger-Eforo, Note, Sanctuary for the Whales: Will This Be the Demise of 
the International Whaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?, 
8 PACEINT'LL. REV. 439, 465 (1996). 
57. Christine Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity: Two Worlds of Eco-
Capitalism, 73 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 6376, 6380 (2001), available at 2001 WL 24253102 
[hereinafter Ingebritsen, European and Cultural Identity]; Stein, supra note 9, at 170; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
58. Stein, supra note 9, at 156. 
59. See Howton, supra note 1, at 182. 
60. Stein, supra note 9, at 170. 
61. David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic 
Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risk of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 166 (1995). 
62. Id.; Ingebritsen, European and Cultural Identity, supra note 57. 
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Norway to the moratorium. 63 Second, Norway's decision to resume 
whaling has not violated relevant international treaties. 64 Third, the 
continuation of Norwegian whaling has not violated customary 
international law. 
The International Whaling Commission Lacks Enforcement Power 
When the pro-whaling nations formed the IWC, the parties did not 
contemplate the necessity for an enforcement mechanism and, therefore, 
did not include one in the text. Consequently, the IWC cannot penalize 
Norway for continuing to harvest minke whales in the absence of such a 
mechanism.65 In fact, the IWC has no power to enforce any of its 
restrictions. Instead of creating an institution of legal enforcement, the 
whaling nations that formed the IWC created "normative institution" 
that can only apply lressure to encourage member nations to comply 
with its regulations.6 
In an attempt to substitute for the missing enforcement mechanism 
in the IWC, the United States legislature enacted two amendments that 
have the potential to punish nations that contravene or violate 
international conventions.67 The Pelly Amendment, enacted in 1971, 
authorizes the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to advise the President 
when a nation acts to "diminish the effectiveness" of any international 
fishery conservation agreement, such as the ICRW.68 If a nation 
continues whaling in violation of the ICRW, the Secretary can certify 
that nation and impose a trade embargo on the importation of that 
nation's products. 69 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is narrower 
in scope than the Pelly Amendment. Enacted in 1979, the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment operates under the same certification process as 
63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
64. Id. 
65 . Dylan A. MacLeod, International Consequences of Norway 's Decision to Allow the 
Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling, 6 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 131 , 132-33 (1994). 
66. Hodges, supra note 1, at 323. 
67. See generally Melinda K. Blatt, Woe For the Whales: Japan Whaling Association v. 
American Cetacean Society, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) , 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1285 (1987); 
Schiffman, supra note 5, at 316; Gambell, supra note 2, at 183. 
68. Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982) [hereinafter Pelly 
Amendment]; Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An 
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. 
& PoL'Y 751, 759 (1994); James Brennan & Gene S. Martin, Jr., Enforcing the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 293, 294 (1989); Blatt, supra note 
67, at 1285. 
69. Gambell, supra note 2, at 183. 
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the Pelly Amendment. However, under the Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce can certify a nation that 
specifically violates the ICRW.70 When the Secretary certifies a nation 
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, that nation's share of 
fishing in U.S. waters is drastically reduced.71 
Although Norway has been certified several times, the U.S. has 
refrained from imposing the sanctions authorized by the Pelly and 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 72 In 1992, President Bush found 
that Norway's plan to resume whaling in violation of the IWC's 
moratorium warranted the drastic punishments permitted by the Pelly 
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, yet he chose not to impose 
sanctions. 73 One author argues that President Bush refrained from 
imposing sanctions because he did not want to hurt the trade 
relationship between Norway and the United States.74 When the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce certified Norway under the Pelly and 
Packwood-Magnuson amendments again in 1993, President Clinton 
reluctantly chose to refrain from imposing sanctions in light of 
Norway's commitment to protect the environment.75 Later that year, 
Norway further redeemed itself through its involvement in negotiating a 
peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization.76 These instances of Norway's certification without the 
imposition of sanctions demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the 
amendments as enforcement mechanisms for the IWC. 77 
Even ifthe U.S. imposed sanctions on Norway as a punishment for 
70. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982); Gambell, supra note 
2, at 183; Brennan & Martin, supra note 68, at 294; Blatt, supra note 67, at 1285. 
71. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, supra note 70; Gambell, supra note 2, at 183; 
Brennan & Martin, supra note 68, at 294. 
72. See Stein, supra note 9, at 173-78. 
73. Sarah Suhre, Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling 
Commission's Shift from a Policy of Regulation to Preservation, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 305, 318 (1999). 
74. Stein, supra note 9, at 175. 
75. See id. at 176. 
76. Stein, supra note 9, at 177. In 1993, Norway acted as a channel between the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. Helge Blakkisrud, Norwegian 
Foreign Policy in the 20th Century, at 
http://odin.dep.no/ odin/engelsk/norway /foreign/032001-990092/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html 
(May 2000) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). Norwegian efforts in encouraging Israeli and 
Palestinian leaders to sign the Oslo Accord have been considered a "breakthrough in 
international conflict management." Id. 
77. See David S. Lessof, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination of American and 
International Failures to Adequately Protect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 413, 423-24 (1996). 
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continuing whaling, the U.S. would arguably be acting in contravention 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).78 One of the 
main ob~ectives of GA TT is the elimination of trade barriers between 
nations. 9 Narrow exceptions to GATT authorize a country to 
implement restrictions on imrorts to further the protection of 
"exhaustible natural resources."8 However, GATT does not contain an 
exception that would allow the United States to utilize a general ban on 
imports from Norway as retribution for Norway's whaling policy.81 
Unlike GATT, UNCLOS does not regulate trade; UNCLOS does, 
however, regulate nearly all aspects of the law of the sea and precludes 
the use of unilateral trade barriers. 82 Therefore, if the United States 
imposed the sanctions authorized by the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendments on Norway, the United States would arguably be in 
violation of international law.83 
Another basis exists that could prevent the imposition of sanctions 
under the Pelly Amendment and Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. 
Technically, Norway has not violated the ICRW by continuing to 
promote whaling. The ICRW contains an "opt-out" clause that allows a 
nation to object to an IWC regulation.84 Once a nation files a formal 
objection, the IWC cannot make that regulation binding upon the 
objecting nation.85 When the IWC implemented the moratorium on 
whaling in 1982, Norway immediately objected under the "opt-out" 
78. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 334. 
79. Clay Erik Hawes, Norwegian Whaling and the Pelly Amendment: A Misguided 
Attempt at Conservation, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 97, 118 (1994); General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.l.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GA TT] GA TT is directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. Id. 
80. GATT, supra note 79, art. XX(g); see Ted L. Dorman, The GAIT Consistency of 
U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save the Whales, Dolphins, and 
Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 512 (1991). 
81. Dorman, supra note 80. 
82. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 334. 
83. See Richard J. MacLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of 
Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine 
Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 20 (1994). The United States, however, is not yet a 
party to UNCLOS. Id. While the United States government may not want to implement 
sanctions for the reasons outlined above, American voters may be able to convince the 
government otherwise. Id. A recent United States poll shows that 80 per cent of voters are 
opposed to Norway's commercial whaling and would like President Bush to commence 
action. U.S. Newswire, New National Poll Shows U.S. Voters Strongly Against Commercial 
Whaling, June 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55658950. 
84. MacLeod, supra note 65, at 135. 
85. Id. 
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clause of the ICRW.86 Norwegian whaling thus complies with the 
ICRW.87 However, the fact that Norwegian whaling does not violate 
the text of the IWC has not convinced IWC member-states that 
Norwegian whaling is legal. Armed with only a meager United States-
sponsored enforcement mechanism and the chance that the United 
States may not impose sanctions, the IWC member-states must resort to 
exerting pressure on Norway to change its whaling policy. 
Regulation of Whaling Through International Treaties 
While Norway's whaling practice does not violate the ICRW, other 
international bodies regulate aspects of the whaling industry. UNCLOS 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulate various areas relating to 
whaling; however, Norway has not violated either of these treaties by 
continuing to hunt whales.88 Under UNCLOS, coastal states are 
permitted to regulate up to 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) that extend out from their coastal borders.89 Under Article 
61 of UN CLOS, a state must set limits, based on scientific evidence, as 
to the amount of resources that can be exploited within that state's 
EEZ.90 This means that pro-whaling nations like Norway may choose 
to allow whaling in their EEZs, provided that the nation has set catch 
limits based on scientific research.91 Since Norway bases its minke 
whale catch limits on scientific evidence and sustainable development, 
Norway's whaling complies with UNCLOS.92 
Furthermore, Norway's whaling policy conforms to CITES, which 
regulates international trade of endangered species. In 1983, the minke 
whale appeared in CITES Appendix I, which offers the highest amount 
of protection to endangered species.93 Norway entered an objection to 
this classification of the minke whale based on scientific evidence and 
petitioned to change the minke whale's status from an Appendix I to an 
86. MacLeod, supra note 65, at 135. 
87. Id. at 138. 
88. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Export of Norwegian Whale Products, at 
http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/p2500832/p30003926/index-b-n-a.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2004) [hereinafter Export of Norwegian Whale Products]. 
89. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 327; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UN CLOS]. 
90. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349; UNCLOS, supra note 89, art. 61. 
91. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349. 
92. Id. 
93. Export of Norwegian Whale Products, supra note 88. 
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Appendix II species.94 If CITES moved the minke whale to the 
Appendix II list, Norway and other whaling nations would be permitted 
to trade minke whales commercially.95 
In 1995, CITES changed the criteria it used to determine which 
Appendix a species of flora or fauna would fall. While the new criteria 
attempted to eliminate the politicization surrounding several 
classifications of species, the criteria did not reclassify the minke whale 
to an Appendix II species. 96 Despite the unchanged status of the minke 
whale in CITES, Norway has not violated CITES because the 
convention contains an "opt-out" clause similar to that in the ICRW 
text.97 Since Norway lodged a formal objection to the trade regulations 
in CITES that prohibit the international trade of whales, Norway is not 
legally bound to follow CITES regulations. 98 
In 2001, the Norwegian government lifted a self-imposed ban on 
the trade of whale products in an effort to engage in the international 
trade of minke whales.99 The Norwegian government began to issue 
export licenses and authorized limited commercial export of whale 
products to Japan and Iceland. 100 Along with implementing a licensing 
program, the Norwegian government has mandated that each country 
importing whales from Norway institute a genetic databank to ensure 
that imported whale products do not consist of highly-endangered whale 
species. 101 Coastal whaling communities finally pressured the 
94. See Kevin Eldridge, Whale for Sale?: New Developments in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 24 GA. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 549, 551-58 (1995). 
95. Id. at 550-51. 
96. Id. 
97. PETERH. SAND, TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 155 (1999); Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 13, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
98. SAND, supra note 97, at 155. 
99. Fiskeridepartementet (Ministry of Fisheries), Export of Norwegian Minke Whale 
Products, at http://odin.dep.no/fid/engelsk/008041-070038/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html (Jan. 
16, 2001) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Minke Whale Products]; Walter Gibbs, 
Norwegians, Defying Protests, Will Sell Blubber to Japan, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at 
A6; Agence France-Presse, Japan Negotiating To Buy Whalemeat From Norway, July 30, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 23569285. 
100. Minke Whale Products, supra note 99; Gibbs, supra note 99. Iceland has decided 
to import minke whale products from Norway until it resumes whaling, which is scheduled 
for the 2006 season. Anthony Browne, Whale Trade Back in Business, TIMES (London), 
July 29, 2002, at 13; Whaling Nations Say Foes Have Lost !WC Credibility, SAIGON TIMES 
DAILY, Feb. 13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4469133. 
101. Agence France-Presse, Japan Negotiating to Buy Whalemeat From Norway, July 
30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23569285; Kristin Kovner et al., The Battle Isn't Over; 
Whaling Nations Want to Restart the Hunt, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 14, 2003, available at 
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Norwegian government to permit the exportation of whale products 
when coastal whalers could no longer afford storage costs for the 
thousands of pounds of whale blubber that Norwegians refused to eat. 102 
Although the Norwegian government authorized the trade of whale 
products, the whaling industry has suffered several major setbacks since 
its recent inception. For example, when Norway announced the 
intention to trade minke whale blubber to Japan, international airlines 
boycotted and refused to carry the whale products. 103 As a result of the 
boycott, Norwegian whalers scarcely managed to send Japan a few 
samples of the whale blubber. 104 Norwegians have continued their 
attempts to ship whale products to Japan. However, recent studies have 
shown that North Atlantic whale products contain high levels of 
mercury, prompting Japan to reject recent Norwegian proposals for 
exporting whale products. 105 
Norway's continued attempts to trade minke whale products to 
both Japan and Iceland appears to be in direct contravention of CITES. 
However, Norway has not violated CITES because Norway filed a 
formal objection to the Appendix I minke whale status. 106 Furthermore, 
Norway has not violated UNCLOS by continuing to allow Norwegian 
whalers to hunt within Norway's EEZ. 107 Therefore, Norway has not 
violated relevant international treaties by continuing to hunt and trade 
minke whales. 
Whaling and Customary International Law 
While Norwegian whaling may not violate UNCLOS or CITES, 
many anti-whaling organizations argue that whaling violates customary 
international law.108 The International Court of Justice has defined 
customary international law as consistent state practice out of a sense of 
2003 WL 8873651. 
102. Whalers Bring Home Blubber That's No Bacon, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2000, at 
B9; Charles Goldsmith, Norwegian Buyer Is Stuck With Tons of Blubber Nearing Sell-By 
Date, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 10, 2002, at Al. 
103. Norwegian Whale Cargo Rebuffed by Airlines, SEATTLE TIMES, July 18, 2001, at 
A2; Browne, supra note 100. 
104. Browne, supra note 100. 
105. U.S. Newswire, Norwegian Whale Hunt to Proceed Despite Contamination, Says 
International Fund for Animal Welfare, Sept. 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55662556; 
Agence France-Presse, Norway Warns Pregnant Women Against Eating Whale Meat, May 
13, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2801497. 
106. Eldridge, supra note 94, at 550-51. 
107. See Schiffman, supra note 5, at 349. 
108. Id. 
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"legal obligation."109 Arguably, the preservation of whales has risen to 
the level of customary international law, as evidenced by a majority of 
nations that have condemned whaling and have acted accordingly by 
joining the whale-related treaties listed above. 110 However, not all 
nations have consistently supported the preservation of whales. 111 For 
instance, the United States has continually condemned whaling through 
the IWC, yet has allowed limited whaling by aboriginal tribes living in 
the United States. 112 This inconsistency tends to show that whale 
preservation has not yet become international custom. 113 
Norway has fought to keep the preservation of whales from 
becoming international custom. 114 For whale-related treaties that anti-
whaling nations have signed to protect whales, Norway has entered 
objections and reservations to the provisions of each treaty that attempt 
to regulate the whaling industry. 115 Under international law, a nation 
that persistently objects to a custom will not be bound by that custom. 116 
Norway's persistent objections to the IWC's moratorium on whaling 
mean that Norway can legally violate the moratorium. 117 Therefore, 
even if the preservation of whales has become customary international 
law, Norway's persistent objections exempt Norway from these 
obligations. Although anti-whaling nations may claim that Norway has 
not complied with international law, Norway has not violated the 
ICRW, UNCLOS, CITES, or customary international law. While 
Norwegian whaling may be legal under international law, the decision 
to continue whaling may negatively affect Norway's further relations 
with the rest of Europe and the other Nordic countries. 118 
109. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 19691.C.J. 3, para. 
77; MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (3d ed. 1999). 
110. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 324. 
111. Id. at 329-30. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 330-31. 
114. See Schiffman, supra note 5, at 331. 
115. See Eldridge, supra note 94, at 550-551; Hodges, supra note 1, at 303, 315; 
Schiffman, supra note 5, at 318. 
116. Schiffman, supra note 5, at 331-32. 
117. Id. at318. 
118. Howton, supra note 1, at 182; Valeria Neale Spencer, Domestic Enforcement of 
International Law: The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 Cow. J. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 109, 113 (1991); Hodges, supra note 1, at 299; Schiffman, supra 
note 5, at 331. 
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III. THE EFFECT OF NORWAY'S WHALING ON NORWEGIAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
135 
Despite the fact that Norwegian whaling complies with 
international law, Norway will confront continued opposition to its 
whaling industry. Norwegians have shown no signs of relinquishing 
their whaling policy because, along with fishing and the protection of 
the environment, whaling is part of the Norwegian culture and 
identity. 119 This culture and identity has played a large role in 
Norwegian foreign policy, especially with regard to the E.U. 120 
Norwegian foreign policy vacillates between an "outward-looking 
tendency and a more introverted isolationist impulse."121 Norwegians 
desire the benefits of integrating with Europe, but are skeptical of 
joining any organization that would force Norway to become bound by 
international agreements. 122 For example, while Norway depends on 
trade with the E.U., Norwegians have proven that they value their 
culture and identity more than they value integration into a tariff-free 
economy. 123 Norway has negotiated integration with the E.U. several 
times; however, Norwegians have ultimately rejected integration each 
time fearing that Norwegian identity would be replaced with a neutral, 
undistinguishable identity. 124 
Norwegian Isolationism 
Despite common policies and identities, Norway's path to 
integration diverged from that of Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. One 
reason for this divergence is the fact that Norway did not regain 
independence until 1905, after nearly 600 years of union with Sweden 
and Denmark. 125 When Norway finally became independent, the 
country was ill-prepared to handle the security issues that evolved over 
the course of the next century. 
Norway's experience in World War II forced the government to 
look to foreign powers for security protection. During World War II, 
119. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 5; Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical 
Question in the Whaling Debate, 9 GEO. lNT'L ENVTL L. REV. 355, 374 (1997). 
120. Nytt fra Norge for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalization and Norwegian 
Identity, available at http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/history/032005-9904 71 /index-
dokOOO-b-n-a.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). 
121. Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
122. Id. 
123. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 6. 
124. See Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
125. Id. 
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Nazi occupation threatened Norwegian culture and values. 126 Norway's 
attempt to remain neutral like Sweden failed miserably. 127 The threats 
on Norwegian security forced the country to seek protection from the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT0). 128 Norway relied on the 
involvement of the U.S. in NATO, especially since the U.S. had 
emerged as the new superpower after World War II. 129 However, 
Norway did not accept NATO protection unconditionally. Just as 
Norway entered objections and reservations to the conventions 
regulating whaling to protect its sovereignty, Norway also entered 
several reservations upon joining NAT0. 130 
Unwilling to relinquish more sovereignty than necessary, Norway 
conditioned its participation in NAT0. 131 Norway refused to permit 
access to Norwegian bases unless Norway was under attack and 
declined to allow NA TO to deploy any nuclear weapons from 
Norwegian soil. 132 The threats to Norwegian security during World 
War II and the Cold War, coupled with the fear that the country would 
become more marginalized, encouraged Norway to seek cooperation 
with the rest of Europe. 133 
As Norway recovered from World War II and the Cold War, 
security became less of an issue, and Norway focused more on 
European trade. Norway remained reluctant to marginalize its 
sovereignty and identity; however, the nation became heavily reliant on 
trade with the rest of Europe and subsequently joined several European 
economic organizations to take advantage of the tariff-free market in 
Europe. For example, Norway entered into the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in 1961.134 When the E.U. established its internal 
market in 1992, the members of EFTA and the E.U. negotiated the 
establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA). 135 Norway also 
became dedicated to several regional organizations, including the 
126. Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Convergence from a 
Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y, 237, 253 (2001/2002). 
127. Pertti Pesonen et al., The Three Nations of Northern Europe, in To JOIN OR NOT 
TO JOIN: THREE NORDIC REFERENDUMS ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 46 (Anders 
Todal Jenssen et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Three Nations of Northern Europe]. 





133. Clive Archer, Norway: The One that Got Away, in THE 1995 ENLARGEMENT OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 147 (John Redmon ed., 1997). 
134. Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
135. Id. 
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Barents Cooperation, the Baltic Sea Council, and the Arctic Council. 136 
These organizations helped to maintain security and promote trade 
throughout the region. 137 
Although Norway has remained active in the EEA and regional 
organizations, Norwegians have refused to give up sovereignty and 
identity by completely integrating into the E.U. Norway has a 
complicated history of accepting and rejecting European integration.138 
The Norwegian government first sought membership in the European 
Community in the 1960s.139 However, when the government held a 
referendum in 1972, Norwegians voted against membership. 140 The 
vote reflected the divide between the small, coastal villages in Norway 
that fought to maintain their cultural traditions and the large cities that 
sought to increase free trade with the rest of Europe. 141 The ability of 
Norway to make sovereign decisions became a focal point for the anti-
European campaign. 142 Norwegians feared that a remote entity like the 
European Community would try to govern Norway in a manner that was 
inconsistent with Norwegian ideals and traditions. 143 
Norway negotiated membership into the E.U. for a second time in 
the early 1990s. At the time, joining the E.U. seemed like the next 
logical step for Norway after having taken advantage of the internal 
market through the EEA. 144 Plus, Norway had been operating at a 
disadvantage within the EEA; Norway could participate in the early 
stages of policy development but could not participate in the final 
decision and had to implement that final decision into Norwegian 
law. 145 Norway also felt pressured by its Nordic neighbors to join the 
E.U. Denmark acceded into the E.U. in 1972, and Sweden and Finland 
began negotiating their membership in the early 1990s. 146 
136. Blakkisrud, supra note 76; Ingeborg Grimsmo, Norway's Environmental Policies 
in an International Perspective, available at 
http://odin.dep.no/ odin/ engelsk/norway I environment/03 2091-991564/index-dokOOO-b-f-
a.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). 
137. Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
138. See Pertti Pesonen et al., To Join or Not to Join, in To JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN: 
THREE NORDIC REFERENDUMS ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Anders Todal 
Jenssen et al. eds. , 1998) [hereinafter To Join or Not to Join]. 
139. Id. at 20. 
140. Id. 
141. Archer, supra note 133, at 148. 
142. Id. at 155. 
143. Id. 
144. Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
145. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57. 
146. Pacsal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Points, available at 
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Although membership seemed inevitable, Norway rejected 
European integration in 1994 due to several obstacles that Norwegians 
could not overcome. These obstacles involved the regulation of fishing 
and oil. If Norway had accepted European integration, the count~ 
would have lost the right to regulate fishing in Norwegian waters. 1 7 
For example, the E.U. would have regulated Norwegian coastal waters 
and opened these waters for exploitation by other E.U. members. 148 The 
fisheries policy of the E. U. had a reputation for allowing over-
exploitation of marine resources. 149 Also, Norwegian oil production 
that created wealth for Norwegians would have been collectivized by 
the E.U. Thus, Norwegian oil would have become a commodity 
available to all E.U. members. 150 In fact, Norwegians felt so strongly 
about maintaining their sovereignty over oil that when a document 
surfaced during the E.U. campaign revealing the fact that Norwegian oil 
would become a community resource, the pro-E.U. campaign knew it 
had lost the referendum. 151 In sum, the E.U. challenged Norway's 
sovereignty over oil and fishing regulation, and Norway's traditional 
management of these natural resources. 152 
Like the regulation of oil and fish, European integration would 
have also impinged upon Norway's sovereign right to harvest whales. 
Norway's decision to resume whaling in 1993 posed a significant 
problem for the E.U. because the E.U. was an anti-whaling 
organization. 153 However, the E.U. offered the following compromise 
to facilitate negotiations: Norway would be allowed to continue hunting 
minke whales for two years, after which time the policy would be 
reviewed. 154 The compromise satisfied neither the Norwegians nor the 
anti-whaling nations within the E.U. 155 Despite negotiations with the 
E.U., the 1994 referendum rejecting European integration demonstrated 
that the Norwegian people clearly did not want to relinquish Norway's 
sovereignty or ability to regulate fishing, oil production, and whaling. 156 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_glance/12/txt_en.htm#l (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2004). 
147. Archer, supra note 133, at 153. 
148. Id. 
149. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57. 
150. Archer, supra note 133, at 153. 
151. Id. 
152. Ingebritsen, European & Cultural Identity, supra note 57. 
153. STANLEY P. JOHNSON & GUY CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 11 (2d ed. 1995); STOETT, supra note 12, at 90. 
154. Caron, supra note 61, at 167. 
155. Id. 
156. To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138. 
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Just as Norway rejected E.U. membership, Sweden and Finland, 
both approved accession into the E.U.157 One explanation for the 
diverging integration policies could be that Sweden and Finland faced a 
certain urgency to join as their respective economies headed toward 
recessions and increased unemployment. 158 The Norwegian economy, 
on the other hand, flourished from the production of oil off the 
Norwegian coast and did not face the same high unemployment as 
Sweden and Finland. 159 Therefore, Norway could risk non-membership 
to protect the nation's sovereignty and cultural traditions. 
Even though Norway rejected membership, the Norwegian 
government understood that Norway could no longer operate without 
cooperation with the E.U. For example, Norway continues to rely on 
bilateral trade agreements with the E.U. today. 160 However, by refusing 
membership in the E.U., Norway now relies on cooperation with the 
E.U. but does not have a voice to affect policies within the organization. 
Norwegian influence on policies within the E.U. is limited to Norway's 
contact and communication with other member states. 161 
Despite Norway's continued cooperation with the E.U., Norway 
still practices isolationism to protect the right to whale and preserve 
Norwegian coastal waters from over-exploitation. 162 Norwegians 
continue to believe that they made the right decision by rejecting E.U. 
membership, especially because the nation continues to prosper without 
the help of the E.U. 163 Unaffected by this isolationism, Norway 
continues to hold sacrosanct its sovereignty and right of self-
determination.164 
157. To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138, at 20. 
158. G. Porter Elliott, Neutrality, the Acquis Communautaire and the European 
Union's Search for a Common Foreign and Security Policy under Title IV of the Maastricht 
Treaty: The Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 
624 (1996); To Join or Not to Join, supra note 138; Matthew H. Wexley, Note, The Impact 
of Sweden's Accession into the European Union on its Social and Labor Policies, 4 
CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 189, 190 (1996); Lars Svasand, The Re-Emergence of the EU 
Issue in Norwegian Politics, 74 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 329 (2002), available at 2002 WL 
23105681. 
159. Svasand, supra note 158. 
160. Blakkisrud, supra note 76. 
161. Id. 
162. Stephen D. Moore, No Surprise? Norway Weighs Assets in Economy, Defense 
Against EU Benefits, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 28, 1994, at 1. 
163. Archer, supra note 133, at 153. 
164. Hodges, supra note 1, at 317. 
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Norway and Sweden: A History of Cooperation 
Although Norway may be isolated from the rest of Europe, 
Norway's relationship with Sweden will prevent Norway from complete 
isolation. Based on a shared history and similar approaches to culture 
and the environment, the two countries benefit from an enviable level of 
cooperation.165 Because of this deep-rooted cooperation, Norwegian 
whaling could have a negative impact on Sweden. For example, despite 
their small size, both Sweden and Norway are model environmental 
nations. 166 Sweden maintains a reputation as an environmental 
powerhouse and continues to be influential on a global scale. 167 
Although Norway also has a reputation for stringent environmental 
policies, its credibility as an environmentally conscious nation is 
undermined by its whaling policy. 168 Similarly, Sweden's 
environmental reputation and status as a model nation will be negatively 
affected if Sweden supports Norwegian whaling. However, if Sweden 
adamantly opposes Norwegian whaling, the cooperation between the 
two countries could dissolve. 
Norway: A Model State Gone Bad? 
Despite the small physical size of their respective countries, both 
Norway and Sweden have influenced environmental policies far beyond 
Scandinavia. 169 Understanding that environmental problems ignore 
state boundaries, Norway and Sweden have contributed their "limited 
power and resources" to the resolution of both national and global 
environmental problemsY0 Through their contributions, Norway and 
Sweden have been elevated to the status of environmental model 
nations. 171 One example of a contribution by Norway and Sweden to a 
165. Ola Tunander, Nordic Cooperation, 
http://odin.dep.no/ odin/engelsk/norway /foreign/032005-990418/index-dokOOO-b-f-a.html 
(last updated Feb. 4, 1999) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004 ). 
166. See generally Grimsmo, supra note 132; Detlef Jahn, The Social Paradigms of 
Environmental Performance: The Nordic Countries in an International Perspective, in THE 
NORDIC ENVIRONMENTS: COMPARING POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLICY ASPECTS 
111 (Marko Joas et al. eds., 1999). 
167. Jahn, supra note 166. 
168. Id.; see generally Grimsmo, supra note 136. 
169. See generally Anna Kronsell, Can Small States Influence EU Norms? Insights 
from Sweden 's Participation in the Field of Environmental Politics, 74 SCANDINAVIAN 
STUD. 287 (2002), available at 2002 WL 23105679; Christine lngebritsen, The 
Scandinavian Way and its Legacy in Europe, 74 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. 255 (2002), available 
at 2002 WL 23105677 [hereinafter Ingebritsen, The Scandinavian Way}. 
170. See Kronsell, supra note 169. 
171. See generally Grimsmo, supra note 136. 
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global environmental policy involved the formation of a joint fund to 
aid environmental projects in Asia. 172 In addition, the Swedish 
Parliament has tried to set an example by adopting idealistic 
environmental goals that should be resolved within one generation. 173 
These goals involve cooperation on the public, private, and non-profit 
level, as well as objectives such as improving air and water quality, and 
ensuring that marine life in bodies of water flourish. 174 Sweden further 
proved its influence at the international level when Swedish policy 
makers initiated and hosted the first United Nations conference on the 
environment. 175 
Norway has similarly been influential as a global environmental 
model. 176 Norway's source of power in the environmental field began 
with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who made 'sustainable 
development' "a buzzword in international development."177 The norm 
of sustainable development-using natural resources while preserving 
enough for future generations to enjoy-has nearly been internalized by 
Norway. 178 Sustainable development encourages environmental 
policies to "anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental 
degradation." 179 Norway has tried to show that a policy of sustainable 
development can be applied to whaling. 180 Even Norwegian 
environmental groups support Norwegian whaling, as Norway has 
ensured that its whaling policy is consistent with the idea of sustainable 
development. 181 Norway hopes that anti-whaling nations will soon 
172. BBC Monitoring Europe, Sweden and Norway Establish Asian Environment 
Fund, July 24, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60045084. 
173. Svenska Miljonatet, Sveriges Miljomal, 
http://www.miljomal.nu/english/english.php (last updated Nov. 21, 2003) (last visited Jan. 
11, 2004). 
174. Id. 
175. Kronsell, supra note 169; Duncan Liefferink and Mikael Skou Andersen, 
Greening the EU: National Positions in the Run-up to the Amsterdam Treaty, 7 ENVTL. POL. 
66, 74 (1998). In 1972, Sweden hosted the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. Id. At the conference, Swedish policy makers presented their research on 
acid rain, hoping to spark international cooperation on an issue that continued to plague 
Sweden despite Sweden's attempts to combat acid rain internally. Id. 
176. Grimsmo, supra note 136. 
177. Ingebritsen, The Scandinavian Way, supra note 169. 
178. Id. 
179. Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/10 (1990). 
180. See Alf Hakon Hoel, Norwegian Management of Living Marine Resources, at 
http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/environment/03209 l-120004/index-dokOOO-b-n-
a.html (Dec. 2000) (last visited Jan. 11, 2004); Caron, supra note 61, at 159-60. 
181. Barrack Otieno, Whales, Elephants Divide Endangered Species Delegates, ENVTL. 
NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2000, available at http://forests.org/archive/africa/wheldive.htm. 
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realize the validity of sustainable development as a method for 
conserving whales. 182 
Thus, both Sweden and Norway have evolved into model countries 
as a result of their global environmental contribution. 183 Nevertheless, 
Norway could undermine its status as a model country by continuing to 
hunt minke whales contrary to international sentiment. Likewise, 
Norwegian whaling may harm Sweden's reputation as an environmental 
model if Sweden supports Norway's whaling policy. 
Nordic Cooperation orNordic Tension? 
In addition to undermining environmental achievements, Norway's 
unilateral decision to resume whaling may cause tension in the Nordic 
region as a whole. The Nordic countries-Norway, Sweden, Iceland, 
Denmark and Finland-"have more in common than most neighboring 
countries."184 Through the creation of two regional ministries and a 
treaty, the region has sought to solidify the strong bond that exists 
between them. 185 The Nordic countries all share an interest in 
maintaining stability within the region and acting in concert with their 
international foreign policies. 186 Over the years, these countries formed 
economic partnerships to compete and prosper internationally and taken 
similar stands on disarmament, development aid and human rights. 187 
In 1952, the Nordic countries strengthened their cooperation by 
forming the Nordic Council. 188 The Nordic Council works to promote 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004). A member of a prominent Norwegian environmental group 
commented: "As long as [Norway] can harvest the surplus without reducing the stocks 
significantly, we think whaling is a good thing." Otieno, supra note 181. 
182. Jennifer Bailey and Brad McKay, Are Japanese Attitudes Toward Whaling 
American-Bashing? A Response to Tanna and Hamazaki, ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN 
REVIEW, Oct. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15349858. 
183. Most recently, Norway has become a model nation for other oil producing nations. 
Bob Davis, Oslo Offers Iraq a Key Lesson in Revival; Once Tethered to Oil's Cycle of 
Boom and Bust, Norway Revamped and Recovered, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 30, 2003, at Al. 
Norway is unique as an oil producer because the government has segregated the oil business 
from the Norwegian economy and has clearly stated that the people own the oil, as opposed 
to one private entity claiming ownership rights. Id. Economists would like to recreate in Iraq 
the Norwegian idea that profits should be shared with every citizen. Id. A senior analyst 
stated: "If oil revenues have to be shared with everyone, you can't take the money, leave 
everyone poor, and spend it on nuclear weapons." Id. 
184. Three Nations of Northern Europe, supra note 127, at 37. 
185. Id. at 47. 
186. See id. 
187. lngebritsen, The Scandinavian Way, supra note 169; Three Nations of Northern 
Europe, supra note 127, at 47. 
188. Three Nations of Northern Europe, supra note 127, at 47. 
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inter-parliamentary cooperation and ensure cooperation in the 
legislation of the Nordic countries. 189 In 1962, the Nordic countries 
created and signed the Treaty of Cooperation. 190 Under the Treaty, the 
Nordic countries "endeavor to maintain and further develop cooperation 
between ... cultural, social and economic fields as well as in regard 
to ... the protection of the environment."191 Several articles of the 
Treaty suggest that when issues of international commercial policy or 
economic policy are present, the Nordic countries should consult one 
another. 192 With the Nordic Council and the Treaty of Cooperation, the 
amount of cooperation among Nordic countries remains unparalleled. 193 
The close relationship shared by the Nordic countries implies that 
the decisions of one country may positively or negatively impact the 
other Nordic countries. For this reason, Nordic Ministers should 
consult one another before making a decision that will impact the other 
Nordic states. 194 Norway's unilateral decision to continue its whaling 
practices, though receiving some support from Iceland, could strain the 
relationship between Norway and the other Nordic countries. 
Norway's nearest Nordic neighbors, Iceland and Sweden, each 
have treated the whaling issue differently. Iceland, a pro-whaling 
nation, did not follow Norway's lead in formally objecting to the IWC's 
moratorium and discontinued whaling under pressure from anti-whaling 
countries within the IWC. 195 After learning that the IWC had no 
intention of revoking the moratorium, Iceland withdrew from the IWC 
in 1992 and helped create the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission (NAMMCO) with Norway and Denmark. 196 These 
countries formed NAMMCO due to dissatisfaction with the IWC's 
zero-catch limits and ineffective decision-making. 197 However, Norway 
did not contribute to the legitimacy of NAMM CO as a replacement for 
189. Nordic Council and Council of Ministers, History of the Nordic Region (May, 8, 
2001), at http://www.norden.org/web/1-1/fakta/uk/1-1-4-nordens_hist.asp?lang=6. (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2004). 




193. See Barnes, supra note 3. 
194. Tunander, supra note 165. 
195. Sean D. Murphy, Blocking of Iceland's Effort to Join Whaling Convention, 96 
AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (2002). 
196. Caron, supra note 61, at 163. Denmark helped create NAMMCO at the behest of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which have interests in whaling but cannot enter into 
international treaties because they are under the sovereign rule of Denmark. Id. 
197. Id.; see also Howton, supra note 1, at 181. 
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the IWC as Iceland had hoped. Therefore, Iceland reapplied for 
membership in the IWC in 2001.198 Once Iceland was readmitted into 
the IWC, the country announced that its plans to resume commercial 
whaling. However, when the international community, especially the 
United States, expressed extreme opposition to this decision, Iceland 
elected to operate under a scientific exception of the ICRW and hunt 
only 38 whales per year. 199 Britain and 23 other anti-whaling nations 
criticized Iceland for inexcusably violating the spirit of the ICRW.200 
Because of Iceland's small size, the country has had to be careful not to 
solicit retaliation and embargoes that could damage Iceland's 
economy.201 For this reason, Iceland may resent the fact that Norway 
has nonchalantly disregarded international sentiment. 
While Iceland has decidedly pro-whaling views, Sweden is caught 
between the E.U. 's anti-whaling members and its cooperation with 
Iceland and Norway. A majority of Swedish citizens are opposed to 
whaling and, within the IWC, Sweden is considered a "pro-conservation 
nation."202 In 1995, Sweden announced an anti-whaling policy when 
the Swedish Prime Minister sent a message to Norwegian Prime 
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland indicating that Sweden planned to take 
a stronger position against Norway's whaling policy.203 However, 
198. Island Fick Hjalp Med Valjakt, DAGENS NYHETER, Oct. 15, 2002, available at 
http://www.dn.se/Dnet/road/Classic/article/O/jsp/print.jps?&a-66731 (last visited Jan. 11, 
2004) [hereinafter Island Fick Hjalp Med Valjakt]. 
199. Steve Connor, US Threatens Trade War as Iceland Resumes Whaling, Aug. 20, 
2003, at http://lists.envirolink.org/pipermail/ar-news/W eek-of-Mon-20030818/005168.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2004). Iceland lowered its proposed catch limits from 250 to 38 
following intense opposition from anti-whaling nations within the IWC. Steingrimur 
Sigurgeirsson, Iceland Starts Whale Hunt Amid Protests, A.P. Online, Aug. 17, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 61744954. The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries claims that the 38-
whale quota is a "minimalist approach" and shows that the nation is willing to "compromise 
on whaling issues." Amanda Hodge, Iceland Ready to Resume Whaling, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Aug. 8, 2003, available at 2003 WL 61767168. 
200. Colin Woodard, Iceland's Whale Hunting Makes Waves with Critics; Last Week 
23 Countries Protested Iceland's Resumption of Whaling for 'Scientific Purposes,' 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5255597; see also Cod 
Logic, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 56711779. The United States 
threatened to initiate a trade war with Iceland after Icelandic whalers broke the 17 year 
moratorium to catch their first Minke whale in August, 2003. Connor, supra note 199. 
201. See Iceland Kills First Whale Stirring International Outrage, U.S. NEWSWIRE, 
Aug. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55661280; U.S. Trade Sanctions over Whaling 
Resumption, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Aug. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60321521. 
202. Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity, supra note 57; Johanna 
Matanich, A Treaty Comes of Age for the Ancient Ones: Implications of the Law of the Sea 
for the Regulation of Whaling, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 47 (1996). 
203. Norwegian PM Concerned Over Swedish Hardline on Whaling, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, May 27, 1995, available at 1995 WL 7808482. 
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Sweden's whaling policy seemed questionable when Sweden 
accidentally cast the deciding vote in favor of readmitting Iceland into 
the IWC in 2001.204 Though the Swedish chairman argued he was 
confused by the voting process and did not mean to vote for Iceland, at 
least one environmental group questioned that explanation.205 Sweden's 
explanation is further weakened by the fact that barely five months 
earlier, Iceland publicly criticized Sweden's lack of support during 
Iceland's first attempt to rejoin the IWC.206 While Sweden may not 
have acted intentionally, this incident supports the notion that Sweden 
continues to balance the interests of its pro-whaling Nordic neighbors 
with the interests of the anti-whaling members of the E.U. and the 
IWC.201 
Thus, Norway's decision to continue whaling will cause tension 
both between Norway and Sweden and between Norway and the Nordic 
region as a whole. However, because of the long tradition of 
cooperation, the Nordic region will remain quiet and will neither 
confront Norway nor publicly denounce Norway's whaling practice.208 
Since Norway purports to carry out its whaling activities in accordance 
with sustainable development, the other Nordic countries should 
understand that Norway's whaling policy is not meant to over-exploit 
minke whales. 209 This tension will continue to exist as long as Norway 
defies legitimate institutions such as the IWC and the E.U. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF NORWEGIAN WHALING 
While Norway's decision to continue whaling has enraged the 
international community, the Norwegian government argues that 
whaling is necessary to maintain the cultural identity of the small 
Norwegian whaling communities and is not meant to over-exploit 
minke whales.210 Many Norwegians feel that the small, coastal 
communities that have thrived on this tradition would cease to exist if 
204. Island Fick Hjiilp Med Valjakt, supra note 198. 
205. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Sea Shepherd Comments on Whaling Issue, 
at http://www.seashepherd.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society]. 
206. See BBC Monitoring, Iceland Threatens Consequences for Lack of Swedish 
Support in /WC, DAGENS NYHETER, May 23, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21781670. 
207. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, supra note 205. 
208. See Grimsmo, supra note 136. 
209. See id. 
210. Joel R. Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 
62-63 (2000). 
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Norway discontinued its current whaling policy.211 Norway based its 
decision to resume whaling on evidence released by the IWC's 
Scientific Committee, showing that the minke whale population could 
sustain limited whaling.212 This scientific evidence, however, will not 
ameliorate the tension in the Nordic region, especially between Norway 
and Sweden, who must balance anti- and pro-whaling interests in order 
to appease both their Nordic and European neighbors. Despite the 
tension in the region, Norway will continue to harvest whales as long as 
whaling remains a part of Norwegian culture and identity, and 
represents the right of self-determination.213 
While Norwegians refuse to renounce whaling as the source of 
their national pride and culture, Norway has engaged in the promotion 
of sustainable development as a means of conservation to help 
legitimize its whaling practices.214 A new form of eco-tourism, called 
"Whale Safari," teaches the public about sustainable development as it 
relates to Norwegian whaling.215 A popular tourist attraction in Western 
Norway, Whale Safari gives participants the opportunity to tour a 
whaling vessel.216 After the boat tour, participants are encouraged to try 
whale meat at the local restaurants and buy t-shirts that display pictures 
of Viking whalers and slogans such as "intelligent food for intelligent 
people."217 While anti-whaling governments and non-governmental 
organizations tend to politicize whaling, Whale Safari presents an 
alternative view of whaling and hopes to offer insight into Norway's 
sustainable use of whales.218 Advocates of whale preservation, 
including the IWC, suggest the use of whale-watching to replace the 
whale-hunting industry.219 Although whale-watching produces more 
211. Paul, supra note 210, at 62. 
212. See Lessoff, supra note 77, at 441. 
213. J. Baird Callicott, Whaling in Sand County: A Dialectical Hunt for Land Ethical 
Answers to Questions about the Morality of Norwegian Minke Whale Catching, 8 COLO. J. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1, 2 (1997). "All people have the right to self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social, and cultural development." Hodges, supra note 1, at 317; Christine 
Ingebritsen, The Politics of Whaling in Norway and Iceland, 85 SCANDINAVIAN REv. 9, 14 
( 1997) [hereinafter Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling]. 
214. See Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling, supra note 213, at 14. 
215. Id. 
216. Id.; Hvalsafari [Whalesafari], at 
http://www.whalesafari.no/download/HvalsafariENG.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2004) 
[hereinafter Whalesafari]. 
217. Ingebritsen, Politics of Whaling, supra note 213. 
218. Id.; Whalesafari, supra note 216. 
219. International Whaling Commission, Whalewatching, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/Catches.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). 
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money than harvesting whales, Norway will not replace whaling, a 
symbol of its sovereignty and identity, with whale-watching.220 
Norway must now focus on a bigger issue: whether or not it will 
join the E.U. Recently, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne 
Bondevik announced that Norway will likely hold another vote on E.U. 
membership by the year 2010.221 If Norway accepts membership, the 
nation would acquire greater decision-making power and could assist 
Sweden in exerting pressure on the E.U. to adopt more extensive 
environmental policies.222 However, Norway would be required to re-
consider its whaling policy. E.U. member nations have not changed 
their views on whaling since Norway's last attempt to join the E.U. in 
1994.223 The majority ofE.U. members continue to express disapproval 
of whaling and agree that the environment should be regulated 
collectively.224 Unless Norway can successfully bargain with the E.U. 
to retain the Norwegian whaling tradition, Norway may face similar 
outcomes as those of its 1972 and 1994 referendums. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Norway continues to prove that it will withstand threats and 
criticism in order to maintain Norwegian cultural identity and 
sovereignty. The resumption of Norway's whaling practices 
undermines the credibility of the IWC as a regulatory regime; however, 
Norway's whaling does not undermine the purpose of the ICRW, which 
is to regulate whaling and preserve whales for future generations of 
whalers. Furthermore, Norwegian minke whaling does not violate 
international law or custom, and is consistent with international treaties. 
Under international law, Norway can continue whaling, but must do so 
at the expense of a better relationship with Europe and the Nordic 
region. Norway has remained isolated from the rest of Europe, which 
negatively affects the Nordic members of the E.U. If Norway became a 
member, the Nordic region could vote together and play a larger role in 
220. James Brooke, Watching for Whales Is Outpacing Hunting Them, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Aug. 19, 2001, at A2. 
221. Norge Rostar om EU fore 2010, DAGENS NYHETER, Dec. 13, 2002, available at 
http://www.dn.se (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). 
222. See Wexley, supra note 158, at 229. 
223. Ingebritsen, Europeanization and Cultural Identity, supra note 56. In fact, when 
Portugal entered into negotiations with the European Union, the country had to forgo 
harvesting whales. Id. Norway would suffer from the same fate if it chose to join the 
European Union. Id. 
224. Id. 
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European affairs.225 
Arguably, Norway would be better off by abstaining from whaling 
until the IWC is convinced that the minke whale population can sustain 
whaling. However, it is unlikely that the IWC will ever reach that 
conclusion. At the most recent annual meeting of the IWC, member 
nations not only reaffirmed their commitment to uphold the 
moratorium, but a majority voted in favor of creating a Conservation 
Committee to make recommendations to the IWC in furtherance of 
whale preservation.226 Notably, at the conclusion of the IWC meeting, 
the Swedish chairman of the IWC, Bo Fernholm, criticized the IWC for 
implementing a Conservation Committee rather than working toward a 
"balance between conservation and management."227 
If Norway continues to whale under this balance as Sweden 
suggests and regulates the whaling industry based on the idea of 
sustainable development, Norway will eventually prove to the world 
that its whaling practices are not meant to over-exploit whales. For a 
territorially small nation, Norway has exhibited admirable strength in 
standing up to international opposition. Where other countries have 
relinquished traditions to integrate into Europe, Norway has fought hard 
to maintain its cultural identity. However, as long as Norway continues 
to regulate whaling consistent with the idea of sustainable development 
and continues to pursue stringent environmental policies, Norway 
should continue its whaling tradition. Eventually, the international 
community will realize minke whales are thriving despite Norway's 
whaling policy. This will legitimize Norwegian whaling, thereby easing 
the tension in the Nordic region. 
225. Wexley, supra note 158, at 229. 
226. International Whaling Commission, Final Press Release, (2003), 
www.iwcoffice.org/FinalPressRelease2003.htm. (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). 
227. Geir Moulson, Global Whaling Commission Votes to Strengthen Commitment to 
Conservation, THE CANADIAN PRESS, June 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57077604. 
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